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THOMAS J. SARGENT 
University  of Minnesota 
Interest Rates and Expected Inflation: 
A Selective Summary of Recent Research 
ABSTRACT:  This paper summarizes the macroeconomics underlying 
Irving Fisher's theory about tile impact of expected inflation on nomi­
nal interest rates. Two sets of restrictions on a standard macroeconomic 
model are considered, each of which is sufficient to iniplv Fisher's 
theory. The first is a set of restrictions on the slopes of the IS and LM 
curves, while the second is a restriction on the way expectations are 
formed. Selected recent empirical work is  also reviewed, and  its 
implications for the effect of inflation on interest rates and other 
macroeconomic issues are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article is designed to pull together and summarize recent work by a 
few others and myself on the relationship between nominal  interest rates 
and expected inflation.' The topic has received much attention in recent 
years, no doubt as a consequence of the high inflation rates and high 
interest rates experienced by Western economies since the mid-1960s. 
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Most work on the topic has in one form or another been based on Irving
Fisher's famous theory about  interest and inflation (Fisher  1930). That
theory holds that an increase in the rate of inflation expected by the public leads to an equivalent increase  in the nominal rate of interest,  thereby ieaviiig the real rate of  interest unaltered. 
A central message of Keynes's  General Theory is that the tlieoiy  of interest is macroeconomic in content. It was because of its macroeconomic
implications that Keynes (1936) objected  to Irving Fisher's theory about the effect of expected inflation  on nominal interest rates. Fisher's  theory is "classical" in its macroeconomic content, being in the  nature of a "neu­
trality" result, and to deduce  it  requires making a batch of  classical assumptions about the way the  economy is put together.  It was those
assumptions and their policy implications  that no doubt Prompted Keynes to take exception to Fisher's  theory. 
Unfortunately Keynes's message has been disregarded in much of thy recent empirical work that has  purported to enìbrace Fisher's  theory. "Interest rate equations" have been estimated that  cannot he interpreted
either as structural equations or reduced form equations of macroeconomic theory.2 Much of this  work goes astray precisely  because  it  fails  to recognize the macroeconomic  content of Fisher's theory and the alterna­ tives to it. For that  reason, this paper begins in section 1 with a review of
the macroeconomic theory  underlying Fisher's static  proposition that a jump in expected  inflation will be matched by  an equivalent and im­ mediate jump in the nominal rate of interest. Two alternative assumptions are entertained about the way expectations are formed. First, it is assumed that expectations are formed in an ad hoc, "adaptive"  manner, and so is a certain distributed lag of  past actual rates of inflation.  This kind of assumption is used in most empirical work. The alternative assumption is that expectations  "rational" in Muth's (1961) sense, and so equal the predictions of economic theory. My exposition  is in terms of a noiistochas tic model; in that case, the natural way to represent rational expectations is to assume perfect foresight.  Individuals are assumed  accurately to perceive the actual (right-hand) time derivative of the log of the price level, and this is taken to be their expected rate of inflation.3  It happens that it makes great difference how expectations are assumed  to be formed. In the model
a 
with ad hoc, adaptive 
expectations, Fisher's Static proposition emerges only under certain highly  restrictive conditions on the values assumed by the model s parameters, in particular restrictions on the relative slopes of the IS and LM curves,  On the other hand,  with rational expectations, no such restrictions are required. 
While for purposes of simplicity my exposition of rational expectations is in terms of a nonsfochastic model, it should be noted that a more plausible, stochastic version of the theory has been  written down (Sargent  1973), one 305  Interest Rates and Inflation 
that  is  "classical"  in some respects, including the incorporation of a 
version of Fisher's static proposition, but is "Keynesian" in other respects, 
such as its ability to rationalize the existence of business cycles that are 
caused by fluctuations in aggregate demand. It  is my view that such 
stochastic classical models provide the most robust foundations for Fisher's 
theory and certain other classical propositions. The rionstochastic version 
of the model in this paper captures the essence of what is going on in the 
rational expectations model, but fails adequately to indicate how models of 
this kind can be compatible with recurrent business cycles. In any event, 
the models described in this paper do show that wide-ranging implications 
flow from replacing the assumption of adaptive expectations with that of 
rational expectations. 
Section II of the paper contains a short and very selective review of some 
empirical work that has been done on the topic. Most researchers have 
assumed some form of adaptive or fixed-weight--autoregressive expecta­
tions. Unfortunately, as will be shown, most models incorporating such an 
assumption have more parameters than can be estimated from the data, 
and so are not econometrically identifiable. The usual identifying restric­
tion, that a certain sum of coefficients equals unity, is arbitrary and cannot 
be defended on any general principle. The most plausible way to crack this 
identification problem is to assume that expectations ar  rational. That is 
the approach taken in studies by Shiller (1972) and Fama (1973). They 
employ the simplest version of Fisher's theory and use the hypothesis that 
expectations are "rational" to deduce testable restrictions. Theirs is the 
most serious empirical work on the topic yet done. 
[I] THE MACROSTATICS OF FISHER'S PROPOSITION 
In this section I review the statics of Fisher's theory within the context of a 
standard one-sector Keynesian macroeconomic model. Time is continuous. 
I assume an aggregate production function that is linearly homogeneous in 
employment, N, and capital, K, and write it as Y/K = [(N/K), or 
y = 1(X), i'(X) > 0, f"(A) < 0 
where y = Y/K and X = N/K; Y is real GNP, i.e., output per unit of time. 
The marginal product condition for employment can be written as 
- = PR) 
which expresses the assumption that employers hire workers at each 
moment until the real wage equals the marginal product of employment. 
Here w is the money wage, and P is the price level, i.e., the price of the 
one good in the model. a
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The Keynesian investnient schedule makes the rate of capital accuniula tion vary directly with the gap between the marginal product of capital, f()
kf'R), and the real  cost of capital, r -F 
() 
Here r is the instantaneous rate of interest,  is the instclntaneous deprecia­
tion rate, and ir is the  instantaneous expected rate of intlation. 
Consumption, C, is assumed to be a linear and proportional  function of disposable income, Y  T 
K  K K K 
or c = z(y - , - where c = C/K, i  = TIK. Here T is the rate of  tax collections net of transfers, and z is the inatinal propensity to  consume. The national income  identity is 
where g = C!K, C being government purchases of goods and  services per unit of tinie.
 
Portfolio equilibrium is  described by
 
() -_L = m(r.  )  m < 0, 1fl> 0 
where Al  is the supply of  money. 
I posit that the evolution of money wages is governed by the Friedman- Phelps version 01 the  Phillips curve 
11(NN)  + IT; h' > 0; h(;) = 0 
where N3 is the full-employment labor supply and D is the right-hand  time
 derivative Operator. The full-employment labor supply is assumed to allow
 for normal hours
  worked, normal  turnover rates,  etc. Consequently employment in man-years can exceed the  full-employment labor supply if
 aggregate demand is high  enough and if there  is sufficient rigidity in the
 money wage. Given  n-, equation 7 depicts a trade-off bet'eeii the rate of employment relative to the labor supply and the rate of wage inflation. An
 increase in
  ir shifts the Phillips  curve upward by the  amount of that increase. 
I assume that the  labor supply is  exogenous and is  governed b'
(3)  \"( =  '(f*" 
where n is the  proportionate rate of growth of the labor  supply. The model is completed by specifying the way in which  expectations of 307  interest Rates and Inflation 
inflation are formed. The model will be analyzed first  under the assumption 
that expectations of inflation are formed adaptively,  and so are governed
by the distributed lag 
) =  O +  (()U1tO) + /3J'e  cis;  > o 
where  (t0) is an initial value of ir at r0, ir° is an ad hoc shift parameter, and 
/3 is a parameter. 
The evolution of capital is of course governed by 
K(t) = K(t0 ) ±  i(s )K(s)ds 
where K(t) is the initial capital stock at  t0.
 
Collecting equations, the complete model is:
 
(1)  y = 1(A) 
(2)  wIP = f'(A) 
(3)  i = dt)X) - X1'(A) - (r 
(4)  CT = z(y - t ­
(5)  y=c4-i±g+6 
(6)  M/PK = m(r, y) 
(7)	  Dwiw =  h(AK!\J) +  r
 
'­ (8)  ;\lt = \'(()e' 
'r  b (9)  ir(t) = T0 +  + j3  e  ds 




Given initial values for w, ir, and K at t0, and given time paths for the 
exogenous variables M, g. and I for t  t0, the model will generate time 
paths of the endogenous variables y, X, K, I, C, w, P. r,  it, and N°. Notice 
that even though w,  IT, and K are exogenous or fixed at a point in time, 
being inherited from the past according to (7),  (9), and (10), they are 
endogenous from a dynamic point of view. The model  determines their 
evolution over time. 
The niomentary equilibrium of our system can be determined by solving 
equations  through 6 for IS and LM curves. The IS  curve gives the 
combinations of r and y that make the demand for  output equal to the 
supply.  It  is derived by sUbstituting (3) and (4) into (5): 
Since f'(X) > 0, we can invert (1) and obtain 




Substituting this into (5) yields the IS curve: 
1 --
IçJ'  j:  hc 
t, 
ij arnbgu'ju5 sign srie /  (,  r 
')'ci1'Jfl  Hrkss  )  e aboe sucjerrfluter 'g;fl  AA  A 1  penst  'i ifl/:5t out u ,rjm 
T 
?n2 the
T tk.ar  th  tfl marginal i.ropeflsit  to  sa .e.  e'ue 
term is 
d01, r.' ard s!r,çnng  The P  curve ° 
2 1 and i in the usual  ay. An nreae
>  e'  n :'e 
:lararneters
is 
'-.'  un of  n(rc- -n 
s-
-apardhv '-v- 0 
vaiue o 
- u'.e deter­
n vrire the mamnai  pridu- :  000  n A'  anor as P  = Suhstituhng this expression for P into 6  yields tne AivKm>r.  j, the slope of which is eask '.erfed 
curve: M 
he xisth'e in the r-v uane. The LM  curve shows the combinations  o r aad portoho balance.  Its position depends on \. -a 
that  guarantee 
parameters at a  ocnt in trne. 
and  all of ahich are 
The momentary 
th  equilibrium of the system occurs at the rtersection of >5 and L  curves. The momentary or static properties of the model are  those of the standard textbook
 
Fisher's theory
  macroeconomic model. 
amounts to an assertion that the IS cure determines only the nominal interest rate and does not influence empIo ment or the rate of outrut at any  point in time.  Rewrte the IS  curve as I-A--A' Ait­ - rs=i1 
Since  ' > 0, the above equation can he inverted and rearranged to 'yield ill  r  - At'A-.­ >1 - z>v ­ -
=  <0 
Now Fisher's  theory asserts that a jump in tUiTri) by the  at some instant  causes r to same amount. Using lit, we can compute the response &iOir 
of r to a jump in  n' as: 
112>  - = I - A7'Ai------ -4- '(  -
- dir 
Equation 12 gives, in effect, the partial deri utive of the reduced form for 
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equal zero. In general, both derivatives exceed zero. In this case )r/iin K 
for an increase in  - shifts the IS curve upward by the amount ot the 
increase and causes r and v both to increase, so long as the LM curve has a 
positive but finite slope. It follows that r  in general increases by less than 
the increase in  -. How closely the increase in r approximates the increase 
in ir depends on the relative slopes of the IS and LM curves. The flatter the 
IS curve is relative to the Li\1 curve, the more closely )r/hr will approxi­
mate unity.  It  is obvious that i)r/hr equals unity in the special case in 
which the slope of the portfolio balance schedule rnr equals zero, with the 
result that the LM curve is vertical. In that case, the LM curve deterniines v 
while the IS curve determines only the nominal interest rate. 
To put the matter a little differently, in equation lithe term f(X) - Xf'(A) 
- (l - z)(J  - --- g + zt] can he interpreted as the real rate of interest. 
Unless the LM curve is vertical, jumps in ir will cause partially offsetting 
jumps in the real rate of interest as A and y expand in response to increases 
In  IT. 
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that there is a sense in which 
there obtains a long-run, steady-state version of Fisher's proposition in the 
above model, regardless of the particular parameter values.  It can be 
verified easily that the model possesses a steady-state value of y. call it y, 
given by:6 
n + g ± &(1 -- z) - zi
(1i.) 
The steady-state value of y depends only on the fiscal policy variables g 
and ti and is independent of DM/M, DPIP, and ir. Steady-state values of the 
nominal interest rate are computed from the inverted IS curve 11  by 
evaluating y and A at their steady-state values. Given fixed values of g, 
and DM!M and given stability, the system will over time approach such a 
steady state. Notice that given g and f,  a switch to a money supply path 
with higher DM/M will leave the steady-state values of y,  A, and r ­
unaltered. This invariance of the steady-state value of r - IT to DM/M and 
so to ir amounts to a long-run version of Fisher's theory. 
However, to justify the econometric procedures of Fisher and his follow­
ers, it is the static version of the proposition that must obtain. That is the 
version of the proposition needed to rationalize the usual interpretation 
assigned by the authors to their regressions. 
Perfect Foresight 
For Fisher's static proposition to emerge in the preceding version of the 
model, special restrictions must be placed on the values of the parameters 310 
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of the model, namely,  a steep LM curve (or a  'ery flat IS Curve). 
Here I show an alternative  way enabling Fisher's proposition 
to emerge in model, a way not dependent oii assuming particular  this 
parametric values method is to abanori the assumption ot ad hoc or adaptive 
The 
expe(tations and instead assume perfect  foresight.  I now abandon (9)  arid for it substi. lute 
(')  r(t) = ()P(tVf'(() 
where I continue to  interpret 0 as the right-hand time derivative Operator Equation 9' asserts that  people accurately  perceive the right.ha 
time derivative of the log of  the price level, i.e.,  the rate of inflation over the immediate future. In  conjunction with the  FriedmanPhelps form  of the Phillips curve that I have assumed. (9') will play a key role in making1 - and other real  variables invariant with  respect to movements in less of the  particular parameter  values assumed 
, regard 
To solve the model,  I  begin by substituting  (9') into (7) to obtain 
r 
OP --=h 
Differentiating (2)  logarithmically with  respect to time gives 
0' 
Equating (13)  with (12) gives 
'ri_1DA N'  t'(A) 
where f"(A)/f'(A)  < 0. Now (14)  is  a  differential  equation  in  the employmentcapital  ratio A, which may be solved for  A in terms of past
 values of K and N'. To illustrate,
 




['(A)  A(I - a)A
 
["(A)  - a(1 -

f'A) 
Also  Suppose that h(AK/N') 





where 'loK'  denotes the  natura! logarithm  Then (14)  becomes VIog N - y log N3  aP  = 
A  log N + il) log k S
C
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Rearranging, we have 
(y+ D)logN  ylogN  -i- aD IogK 
or 
(1 + D)logN = - log N  -!J log K 
This is a linear, first-order differential equation in log N. Its solution  is 
OK(s) logN(t) =  -1'  )I)rJ log Ns(skls

aJ  '
  K(s) 
Equation (16) is the solution to equation (15) and  expresses tog N at  as 
distributed tags of past values of the labor supply and capital stock. Since 
these are predetermined at time t, we inirnediately know that employment 
and hence output will not respond at  to the imposition of shocks to the 
system in the form of changes in g,  or M at  t. 
Given the value of N at t determined from some version of (16), and 
given the quantity of K inherited from the past, output is determined by 
equation 1, the real wage by (2), and c by (4). Given c and y, (5) then 
determines i. Given i and X, equation 3 determines r - r at t. Equation (7) 
determines (Dw/w) - (OPIP). So r - ir is predetermined, and thus invariant 
with respect to ir(  DPIP). So Fisher's static proposition holds. 
All real variables have now been determined, and it remains only  to 
determine the values of P and OP/P at instant t. They are determined by the 
portfolio balance condition in the following manner. We know that in this 
system r  is determined by (3), which we express by inverting (3) and 
writing 
r = 1(A) - AiA)  + (OPIP)  +  i)  6  = -
Substituting this into (6) gives 
M  = rn[1(X)  A1'(X) - /5 + (OP/Ri + 0(i),  '1 PK 
This is a differential equation in P with forcing variables M, A, and i. To 
illustrate a solution, suppose that m(r, y) has the special form 
ni(r,  0 = 0''v  i < 0 
Then (17) becomes 
log M - log P - tog K = logy - a[I(X) -- X1'(A) -- /5 + (DPiP) 
Rearranging gives 
[(1/a) + 0] logP = (1/a){logM - logK - ajf(X)  f'(X) - /5 + S
312 
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The solution  o the above differential equation is 
(18)  log P(t) = J  (log Al(s)  - tog K(s) 
- 4tlMs)l -- M) !lA( II ­ f 0(i)) )ds 
Equation (18) expresses the current price  level as a function of the entire future path of the money supply, the capital stock, the employment-capital ratio A, and the  rate of investment.7 The vakie of ir is also determined by (18), and can be obtained  by differentiating (18) with respect to time from the right. Notice that the complete time paths of the variables appearing on the right side of (1 8) can be determined  before the current price level is determined; that is, a ver4ion of equation (16) determines the values of N and A at r, and  this enables calculation  of the rate of growth of capital  i. The capital stock can then be updated, and 
subsequent values of N then determined. Proceeding in this way, given the time paths for the exogenous fiscal policy variables, the complete time paths of all the real variables can be determined  before determining the price level  at any moment. In this model,  Fisher's static  proposition clearly  holds, since all real variables, including r  iT, are determined independently of iT and P at any moment. If  at a point in  time the  monetary authority  suddenly and unexpectedly announces a move to a new planned future  money supply path involving a higher rate of growth, OMIM, over the entire future, iT will immediately  jump to a new higher value, as differentiation of (18) with respect to time verifies. But all real variables including r - ir will remain unaffected. Consequently r will increase by the that this result does not depend  same amount as  n. Notice 
on assuming any special as it did under ad hoc or adaptive  parameter values,
expectations. In the adaptive 
expectations scheme (9), the model must be manipulated under the "Keynesian" assumption that the money wage does not jump at a point in time;  so the Phillips curve (7) gives the  time derivative of the wage (= the right-hand
 time derivative  = the left-hand time
 Essentially, that  is because  at any moment  derivative).
1, equations (8), (9), and (10) make N(t), ir(t), and K)))  predetermined from past variables.  Equations  1) through (7) then form a system of seven equdtions in the seven endogenous
 variables y(t),  A(O, itt), c(l), P(t), r(t), and Ow(t)Mr(t).
  The model is incapable
 of restricting any additional  variables, in particular w(t),  at moment t. So
 
time. 
w(t) must be regarded as fixed and inherited from the past at each point in 
However, in the  system with  iT = OP/P.
  it
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time. They caiiiiut jump at a point in time. But if wIP cannot jump, and 
neither can K or y, then if M jumps at a point in time, we know that P and 
w must jump in order to satisfy the  portfolio balance equation at each 
moment. 
Heuristically, what is going on under rational expectations can be 
described as follows. Under rational expectations the demand schedule 
and "supply" (Phillips) curve for labor are, respectively, 
log w(t) - log PU) = log i'[N(t)IK(t)] 
D log w(t) - L) log PU) = h(NI.t)INU) I 
Integrating the supply equation gives 
logwu) - log PU) = J(hIN(s)/N8(s)lds 
Equating this expression for log v  log P to the one troni the demand 
curve gives 
log f'[N(t)IK(t)]  hLN(s)IN(s)]ds = J' 
an expression that determines N(t) solely  in terms of the predetermined 
variables K(t) and current and past values of N and past values of N. The 
assumption of rational expectations,  in conjunction with the Phelps-
Friedman form assumed for the Phillips curve, serves to make the labor 
market equations alone capable of determining employment at any point in 
time. This is what delivers the "classical" features of the model,  including 
among them fisher's static proposition  about the impact of expected 
inflation on the nominal rate of interest. 
Some may regard as implausible and uninteresting both the assumption 
that individuals have perfect foresight and its implication in this model that 
wages and prices jump instantaneously, thereby isolating the workings of 
the labor market from any disturbances to portfolio balance or aggregate 
demand. In particular, this model seems to imply that Were can be no 
business cycle produced by shocks to aggregate demand. However,  this 
implication of the model is  a consequence of my having chosen to 
describe it in a nonstochastic form. It is important to note that there exist 
stochastic (random) versions of the model in which individuals do not 
possess perfect foresight but instead are assumed to  have expectations that 
are "rational"  in Muth's sense: Expectations are assumed only to be 
distributed about the variable people are trying to predict, and so deviate 
from being "perfect" by what may he a very large random term. The 
assumption that expectations are rational  is much weaker and more 
plausible than the assumption of perfect foresight. Stochastic models with 
rational expectations have been constructed that share the main "classical" a
314 
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policy implications of the nonctoch,istic, perfect-foresight 
"ftde! deScrib above. In particular, a version of Fisher's static  proposition holds in such models. On the other hand, such a model is consistent with the 
presence of swings in unemployment and even a business  cycle induced by Iluctua tions in aggregate demand. Models of this class  are described by
(1973b) and are the stochastic  Cousins of the  Sargent 
Pertectforesight  model described here. I have chosen to describe the 
nonstocstic version  here only to simplify to the exposition. That  simplificatiur) is  purchased at  the cost of hiding sonic of the ability of such models  to describe the
tions of output and unemployment observed  in the real world 
fluctua. 
In summary, Fisher's proposition  is an aspect of the classical theory of interest. That theory asserts that the IS curve can be inverted to obtain the reduced form for the interest  rate, e.g., our equation
(11) 1++f(A)-AIA;rl(I,)(V(41J 
i 1: 
In order for this to be the classical reduced form  for the interest rate, the real variables A and y must be predetermined with 
respect to,, and should not respond to disturbances  in  ir, g, or 1.  In the classical  theory such shocks to aggregate demand lead to equilibrating changes in the nominal rate of interest and leave output and ernployflient 
unaffected The key to delivering the classical  interest theory and  Fisher's proposition  is some device capable of rendering output and employriie,it invariant to shocks in aggregate demand. The  standard classical device  for doing that relies on instantaneously flexible  money wages and prices,  the kind of device operating in the above  model with perfect foresight. Such a device also has the effect of making the real  rate of interest  invariant with  respect to movements in the supply of money. With  such a device,  increases in the supply of money are prevented  from exerting  any downward "liquidity effes" on the interest rate. The other side of the coin is that, at least in models in which the interest elasticity of the demand for money is not zero, if there exist negative liquidity effects of money on the interest rate, then an
 increase in  expeded inflation  will give rise  to a less than equivalent
 increase in the  nominal rate of  interest. Despite the preceding the recent literature is full  of empirical work with
 equations that  purport to support  a full and imniediate
 Fisher effect of
 expected inflation on interest rates,  hut at the  same time find an inverse
 liquidity effe  of money  on interest rates.  With a few  exceptions, such
 equation5 have  no interpretation
 within the roeconomic models of the kind  context of standard mac-
Resources  Incorporated)  studied above. For example, the DRI (Data
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schedules, with the result that expected inflation does not appear in the IS 
curve. Furthermore, the DRI model purports to indicate potent effects of 
fiscal policy on real output and employment, despite the presence of an 
approximately full Fisher effect on the nominal interest rate. It is difficult to 
understand how such a model relates to the standard textbook mac 
roeconomic model described above. 
A Digression on the Pigou Effect 
It is appropriate to mention here the point made by Lloyd Metzler (1951) 
that inclusion of a consumption function incorporating a wealth or Pigou 
effect alters the "real" character of the classical theory of interest, and in 
particular causes Fisher's static proposition to fail to hold in a model that 
relies on instantaneous wage and price flexibility to make output invariant 
with respect to aggregate demand.8 For example, suppose that consump­
tion function 4 is replaced by the Pigouvian consumption function, 
(4')  c = c(y - t - 13, M/PK); 1 > c > 0, 2> 0 
Substituting (4'), (6), and (3) into (5) then gives the appropriate IS curve: 
13 (19)  y =c(y - t - &,rn(r, y)] + i[ff) - )i'(AJ - (r +  ir)l +g + 
Suppose that y and X are invariant with respect to movements in g, t, and 
ir. so that (19) is in effect the reduced form for r. On that assumption, the 
reduced form partial derivative of r with respect to iris easily calculated to 
be ôr/ôir = i'/(czrnr - I'). Since c2> 0, then unless m = 0, Th-IOir will 
be less than unity. This happens because an increase in ir, by driving r up, 
causes real balances per unit of capital to fall, thereby lowering consump­
tion demand at each real rate of interest. The real rate of interest must 
therefore fall when ir increases in order to stimulate investment demand 
and thereby keep aggregate demand equal to the predetermined level of 
aggregate supply. 
But there are versions of the classical model in which Fisher's static 
proposition holds even if the consumption function incorporates the Pigou 
effect.  have in mind a version of Tobin's dynamic aggregative model 
(Tobin 1955), which differs from the Keynesian model above only in that it 
replaces the Keynesian investment schedule with a marginal productivity 
condition for capital: 
r + 13  =f(X) -
In Tobin's model, capital and labor are treated symmetrically, unlike in the 
Keynesian model. There is a market in stocks of physical capital which 




I.  Sargeii 
(3') is fillilted. In this model, the role of the L curve is taken over by the curve obtained by substituting A(y) foi  A in  3'):
 
r + &
  = ff A(y) I  My)fi Atv (I 
The foregoing curve shows  the combinations of r and v that 
guarantee equilibrium in the market for existing capital. In the version of this fliorlel with ad hoc adaptive  expectations, momentary equilibrium is
 at the intersection of the LM curve with curve (20). Notice
  determined 
g appears as a determinant of y, A or r 
that neither i nor it at a point in 
time. The consumption function and  national income  identity only  serve to deter­ mine the allocation of output among uses, and play no role  in determining the level of output at a point in  time. 
As in the Keynesian  model, if either rnr = 0 or rational 
expectations are assumed, the effect will be to make v invariant with respect to jumps in at a pornt in time  Under such  a device, then, (20) becomes the reduced form for the  interest rate. Where  this  is  so, the reduced  form partial derivative  JrIt3rr is  unity, regardless of  the form of  the  consumption function. Thus, in that model, Fishers static proposition  that a jump in ii leads to an equivalent jump in r at the same moment holds. Pigou effect or 
not 9 
till EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS 
Most recent  empirical work  on this topic  amounts to an replicate, in one form or another,  attempt to
Irving Fisher's  empirical results.  Fisher implicitly assumed that the real rate of interest is of the expected  rate of inflation  it,,  statistically independent 
r,= a-f- 1T,+  E, 
where a is a constant and  is a random 




zero, and is assumed to be statistically  independent of past arid present determinants of it,. The parameter interest. The  a is the mean real rate of orthogonality of  it, and  , amounts to a roeconomic restriction, since even  classical interest  rate theory suggests 
very severe mac­
that fiscal  variables will influence r and not in general be orthogonal to it.
 Fisher also  posited the extrapolative
 expectations scheme: 
=  w,)log P,  -- ngP, 
vhere the  t',s are 
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(23)  r  a +  n  (log P. _, - log P, - -,) + 
Notice that on the basis of estimates of the parameters of Fisher's equation, 
the parameters w of the expectations-generating function (22) are iden­
tified only because in (?1t it is assumed that the coefficient on ir  is unity; 
that  is,  to  identify the wi's froni estimates of Fisher's equation,  it  is 
necessary to assume a full  Fisher effect of expected inflation on the 
nominal interest rate. In order to be able to test enipirically for the presence 
of a full Fisher effect (e.g., see Feldstein and Eckstein 1970), some followers 
of Fisher have implicitly modified (21) to become 
(21')  r = a + f3i  +  , 
where /3 is a parameter measuring the extent of the Fisher effect. Substitut­
ing (22) into (21 '), we obtain 
(23') r= a+ f3  w(logP,  logP__) ­
Least-squares estimation of (23') delivers estimates of only the n + 2 
parameters  , /3w0, /3w1.....j3w,1, with the result that in the absence of a 
restriction on the ws, /3  is not identifiable. The standard identification 
restriction imposed has been 
= 1 
which is unfortunately an arbitrary and possibly "iriational" restriction to 
impose on the ws. Ironically, that restriction has itself been defended on 
the basis of an appeal, albeit a misplaced one, to rationality. It is held that 
if a constant x percent inflation were to occur over a very long period of 
time, individuals would eventually catch on and expect inflation to occur 




But suppose, instead, that actual inflation were to be governed by the 
Markov process: 
g P - log P  = 0.3 (log P,  log 1.  )  + U, 
where U is a serially independent, unpredictable random varial)Ie with a 
mean of zero. By the same logic applied above, it would seem reasonable 
to expect that individuals would eventually catch on and form their 
(one-period forward) expectations according to I
$
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fl(  I =  lug 
since this  is the best possible for('cating scheme. Here the 1y1 '  do no 
sum to unity. The rlleSSage of this example N that  he dioitt' ol the ft)flç 
reasonable  entitving restriction to impose on the i  )2 (Ieperid5
on how actual iflflatR)ii s'fli5 to be evolving, at le,ii if some stanilarcl of 
rationality is expected tor individual's forecasts. 1 he assumption  4 
=  1  vill not in general be the appropriate restriction to inipnp 
SIflCC 
during the estimation period it could very well be foolish to form  expecta.
tions subject to such a restriction. Estimates of f  identified by such 
restriction ought therefore to be regarded with appropriate  suspicion TA 
In addition to the identification problem present, proceeding  under the 
hypothesis of extrapolative expectations (221 makes it difficult to determine 
what patterns of estimated tv1's ought to be taken as confirriiing the the01 
Generally, poseive estimated w 's and high R 's have been  the ad hu 
criteria for acceptance. But there are tth1fl  patterns of e  's that might meet 
these vague criteria; and such criteria could be  met s'hen calculating 
regressian (23) even if the theory in (2 I I were dead wrong, since interest 
rates and the price level could be highly correlated for  causes having
nothing to do with the effects of expected inflation  on interest rates. What 
is badly needed here is some more rigorous standard for determining what 
pattern  ot n''s confirms the theory embodied  in equation  (2 I ).  The
hypothesis that expectations  are ''rational" provides such a standard.  This
hypothesis also provides  a convenient way of solving the  Preceding
identification problem. Expectations are said to be rational it they equal the
pertinent predictions of economic and  statistical  theory.  In  this case,
positing rationality amounts  to assuming that the expected  rate of inflation
equals the mathematical  expectation of subsequent inflation  based on
available information  If the pertinent horizon for the expectations is, sa', one period forward, rationality  requires 
(24)  , = El,.1J4l 
where  = log P,,  - log P,. i.e., the rate of inflation, and O k the set of
 information available at time
  pertinent for forecasting inflation.  Here F is the mathematical expectation operator. Define the  prediction error  as 
7lt'I =  -. 
Notice that 
EI1  l = fls,.itl  fls,. ('l = 0 
Therefore  it  is not possible to predict the prediction  error Assuming that i k the yield  on a one-period bond  and substituting  (24) into  21) gives















319  Interest Rates and Iriflat ion 
Above it was assumed that  t  is statistically independent of the detc-rmin­
ants of  That assumption must be modified somewhat in order to make 
the model sensible where expectations are assumed to he rationaL tinder 
rational expectations, it is conceivable that r, itself might be used to help 
forecast x,.1. That makes it impossible to assume EIE,j 0,1 = 0, i.e.. that E1 is 
independent of all components of 6,, since 0, includes r,  implying from 
(25) that 
Ei,16,l = E[{r, - a - E(x,,,!6,1}  6,]
 
= Elr,16,J - - Elx,,,IO,1
 
= r, - a - El.x,  IO,l
 
= ft 
Therefore, Ft, I 0,1 cannot be zero.  It  is however permitted instead to 
assume that f  is statistically independent of aI comtx)nents of 0, except r,, 
with the result that E[, I{O, - r,}1 = 0, where { 0, - r,}  is the set of all 
variables in 6, except the value of r at time t. So it is now assumed that f1 is 
statistically independent of all determinants of ir,, with the exception of r, 
itself. Following Shiller (1 972), I now use (25) to calculate the regression of 
r, against any subset 0,, ot  0, -- r, }: 
(26)  1 lr,I0,,  = c f F:.,, 
Equation 26 states that the regression of r, 00 any subset  of the 
information (0, - r,} used in forming expectations of inflation equals the 
regression of the rate of inflation, .s,  , on  the same variables, except for a 
constant term. In particular, 
(26')  Efr4x,.x,_1,  .  .  .1 = a + Ek, .  --2  -i 
so long as the inflation rates x,, x,  ,,  ,  .  .  . arc included in 0,. Thus, the 
theory can he tested by computing the regressions on either side of (26) 
and testing for their identity. Alternatively, notice that the theory implies 
the regression El(r, - x,±,)IO,l = a, which can be computed to test the 
theory. 
Shiller (1972) has applied such a test to quarterly long-term interest rates 
for the United States for the postwar period. While he did not report formal 
statistical hypothesis tests, he found that the theory provides a tolerable 
approximation to the data. For annual U.S. data spanning the period 
1870-1940,  reported the results of comparing the two regressions in 
(26'), and found it  difficult to accept the theory (Sargent 1973ai. The 
regression E[x,+, Ix,, x,_1, .  .  .  was typically a short distributed lag, while the 
regression Elr,Ixt, x,,,  - .J was typically i very long one. The latter re­ . 
gression is a manifestation of the Gibson paradox, the positive correlation 
between nominal interest rates and the price level that Keynes and Fisher 
had detected and tried to explain. rhe remarkable thing about these results 
I 0
320 
is not the finding that the ritodel faded for the 8'Qi 940 data, but 
finding that the model (JOeS adequately weU br the Postwar U.S. data, 
for 
the model is an extraordinarily simple one that, as mentioned above 
severely restricted by the assumption  of zero correlation between 
k 
(almost all) determinants of ir  in (21. One way of koking 
and 
at some 
explanations of the Gibson paradox is as advancing models of the 
correla 
tions between  in (21) and the determinants of ir,. For example,  in the 
context of equation (21),  stands in for all of the fiscal policy 
variables
that are asserted to help determine the rate of interest according to the 
classical theory of interest. That theory asserts that an increase  ir, sa,,
government purchases will increase both the interest rate and the 
price
level, P(. Hence there is reason to expect a positive correlation 
between r
and P1. Since the latter enters on the right side of (26)  or (26), the
orthogonality of  to the determinants of  which was used to derive ,, 
equalities (26) and (26'), does not hold, and therefore the 
equalities
themselves fail to hold. Furthermore, it is possible for such a mechanism to 
set up a strong positive correlation between r, and the level of P,, thus in
principle providing a way to explain the Gibson paradox even in the face 
of expectations of inflation that are short distributed  ags of the actual rate
of inflation.1) 
In any event, what seems to bear emphasizing  is  that while mac­
roeconcjnlic theory, even classical macroeconomic theory,  provides ample
reason to expect correlations between  and the determinants 
Shiller's model apparently perfornis adequately  for the postwar years even
though one of its assumptions is that  such correlations are not there. 
Eugene Fama (1973) tested  an even more restrictive version of the 
model, and like Shiller, found that the  model seems acceptable for describ­
ing the PostWorld \Var II  U.S. data. Fama further restricted the  's in
(21) by assuming that the  are not present. Thus, he assumed the  e\act 
(nonstochastic) relationship 
(21') r1=+ 
Then, using the  rationality hypothesis and the  definition of the Prediction
 
error
  Fama rewrote (21')  as r  =  ,  - ij,  or 
27i  = - '­ -
Since F[1Io1J  0, as we have seen. (27 implies that 1or a subset of O. including r,, the following  regression holds: 
E,11O  = -
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constant. Ths is so because according to (21') the interest rate equals, 
apart from a constant, the public's expectation of subsequent iiillatioii; dud 
by rationality, that forecast is the best one that can be made on the basis of 
information available at time t. 
Fama tested his model using rates on Treasury bills of from one to six 
months' maturity, and using the rate of inflation in the Consumer Price 
Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure inflation,  x,. Fama 
regressed x,1 against r, and x for bills of various maturities. He was unable 
to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on i  is 1.0 while that on x, is 
zero. Thus, Fama's tests fail to support rejection of the very strong version 
of Fisher's theory he assumed. As with the results of Shiller's tests, the 
remarkable thing is that so simple and restrictive a model should prove 
approximately adequate for the postwar years. 
In summary, the evidence on Fisher's theory remains mixed. On the one 
hand, Fama and Shiller have offered evidence that Fisher's theory provides 
a tolerable approximation for explaining the behavior of interest rates and 
inflation in the United States in the postWorld War II period. Against this 
there is evidence that Fisher's theory is not so adequate for explaining the 
preWorid War II data. Those data seem to display the Gibson paradox, 
the tendency of interest rates to be highly con-elated with the price level 
rather than with the (expected) rate of change of the price level as 
predicted by Fisher's theory (see Fisher 1930 and Sargent 1973a). Explana­
tions can be concocted for the apparent hriak in behavior between the 
prewar and postwar periods, one being that the higher rate of inflation 
characterizing the postwar period makes it more imperative for investors to 
devote resources to forecasting inflation properly, thereby strengthening the 
Fisher effect and making it easier to detect econometrically. But as yet, 
such an explanation is speculative since we do not now have an empiri­
cally confirrd explanation for the Gibson paradox in the prewar period. 
Some of my own earlier work (1973a, 1973d) was directed toward 
showing how the Gibson paradox could arise in a "plausible" stochastic 
macroeconomic model. Such demonstrations, while suggestive, are not 
themselves substitutes for an explanation of the Gibson paradox that has 
been subjected to a detailed empirical test. 
Fill! CONCUJSION 
Irving Fisher's proposition  is a classical ''neutrality' result, asserting the 
independence of the real  rate of interest with respect to movements in 
anticipated inflation.  It  is  hardly surprising, then, to find that the recent 
increase in attention paid  to Fisher's proposition has not led Keynesian 322 
economiSts to accept it. Tuhi  ( 974) has pointed out that the the ctock market  in rcc:ent yeaà  h'havioi oi tI(K'  IH)t seem  consistent with  Fihr, theory and with the theory of stock prices impl icit in the
roec000mic model,'7 taken together.  According to 
standard mar. 
classical change in expected inflation  ir that eaves the real  rate of interest 
theory,  a 
unchanged wi1i by itself leave unaffected Tobin's q the rtit) of the 
r -_ 
stock as evaluated in the  equity and bond  markets to  physical 
capita) 
evaluated at its reproduction  price. But q fell dramatically in 
capita) 
especially in 1974, making it difficult for Tobin to believe that
recent years 
nominal interest  rates in recent years was simply a 
the rise in 
'neutral" higher expected inflation.  Instead, it is possible to interpret the fall in q and 
response to 
the rise in r both as due to a rise in the real rate of interest r - , a rise engineered by tight monetary policy and tile
monetary polcy.  prospects for further 
tght 
The observations cited by Tohin  certainly constitute  a puzzle. But would not rely on those observations alone to reject Fisher's theory for the postwar U.S. data, in  view of the empirical findings of Shiller and Farna described above.  My own guess  is that the puzzle  instead  symptomizes deficiencies in the  theory of the stock  market implicit  in the standard macroeconomic model.  For the  reasons laid bare by 
Keynes's famous metaphor of the  "pretty girl contest" (1936,  p. 156), we do not
 have much of a theory about Tobin's q. one capable of
 
seem to 
sorting out the objective causes of a given  movement over time in q. Still, there is much appeal to Tobin's essential point that the sharp movements in q that base occurred in recent years make  it hard to believe
return have remained  that expected real rates of approximately constant while inflation  has acceler­ ated. The importance of Shiller's and  Fama's tests is that,  on the contrary. they suggest  that assuming  that the real  rate is approximately 
constant provides an  acceptable approximation for the behavior of bond yields in the postwar  period. 
There remains another puzzle, namely, the
  apparent success of Fishe(s
 theory for the postwar U.S. data as opposed to scattered  evidence, mainly
 the repeated
 observation of the "Gibson paradox"  over long periods of
 time for U.S.  and British
 data, that the  theory is not borne  out br
 preWorld War II data, I have no satisfactory break between  explanation for this apparent prewar and postwar behavior. I




observations suggesting that the postwar period has been more "classical" 
being the 
prewar period, the mild character of postwar business cycles central such  observation. A observations,  along the lines of  standard explanation for such 
that the  postwar period has been
Samuelson's neoclassical  synthesis, holds 
characterized by a tame business cycle 
could 
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real rate of interest uncovered by Farna's and Shiller's tests. If such policies 
were indeed that much responsible for a stable real rate,  it would be a 
mistake to draw any far-reaching 'classical" policy implications from such 
tests. 14 
NOTES 
Examples of recent work are Gibson (1970), Yohc' and Karnusky (1969), carr and Smith 
(1972), and Feldstein and Eckstein (1970). This list  is far from exhaustive. 
have earlier claimed (Sargent  1 973c) that Feldstein and Eckstein (1970) have an 
example of such an equation. 
t..etp(t) be the price level at timer. Then the right-hand time derivative of p(tl is defined 
as 
tim 
1,-.)  t't 
The time paths of prices described b some of the models below are not  oiitifluOUs, 1)01 
are ''continuous from the right,'' with the result that 
tim p(t'f = pr 
always, even though p(r) may be discontinuous at  r.  Since pIni  is not necessarily 
continuous, its derivative is not delined, though its right-hand derivative may be if there 
are not too many discontinuities. Notice that equating the right-hand dci ivative of the 
log of p0) to expected inflation is the natural way to represent perfect foresight. 
That fewer restrictions on paranieter s'alues are required (or Fisher's theory where 
expectations are rational was claimed on the basis of a stochastc niaCrOecOr101)liC 
model in Sargent (1973).
 
This point is made for a similar model in Sargent (1972).
 
From the national income identity, the rate of growth of capital is
 
I  yz)yt 
In the steady state, I = n. Equating the above expression br i to ri and solving fury gises 
the expression for the steady-state value of y reported in the text. 
7,  Such solutions for the price levei in terms of future values are discussed by Sargent and 
Wallace (1973); a certain terminal condition is imposed, and is discussed by them. In 
116) a solution for the differential equation (15) is given in terms ot pat values of the 
forcing variables, while in (181 a solution of the diffeential equation (17) is given in 
terms of future values of the Iorcing variables. In general, a first-order  differential 
equation can be solved two ways. In one, the dependent variable is expressed as a 
funcuon of past values of the forcing variables and an initial condition; in the other, the 
dependent variable is expressed in terms of future values of the forcing variables and a 
terminat condition, In general, the solution in one direction is stable, while In the other 
direction it is unstable. I have chosen the stable solution in each case, an application of 
the "correspondence principle" of San'iuelson.  In the money and growth literature. 
equations like (17) are sometimes solved in terms of past values of the forcing variables, 
which is the unstable direction. Neil Wallace and 1 have argued that that is the wrong 
direction in which to solve such an equation (Sargent and Wallace 1973). 4
324  iiiiiit',  Sari.tn 1. 
Mundr' I  I 96 3  ha  eniph as ized th  in nt
 
CIear!, '.th a Pigou  .;f- ct, an ir  ii  o,t '',ledt(di,''  iit.- 0  iilt'rt',  tii.

, 
allocation ut output, the rate rut iflt s'striient,  nd thuretuire the rate of grins th river 6 iin'nt 
output and the real rate ot  interest. But F she r's  Stat it  (it  point- in-ti me proposition 
COritiiiuesto hold. 
MOn('y and Eo norm  Growth' Jubi ii  (1 965  I rici udes th  expec ted rate ot 
depreciation of the public's real liokiings cii outside mone' in the disposable incomc' 
term that appears  ri the consumption function. Like the Pigou effect, this makes th0 
expected rate of rntlatinn influence the rate of capital accumulation arid  therefore 
steady-state capital intensity and the real rate of interest. But where the wage and pre 
level are Instantaneously fk'sible, as they are in Tobin's grrisvth model, it can be shown 
by an argument like that in the text, that Fisher's static proposition characterize Tubin's 
modet despite the long-run nonneutral character of changes  in  nr. 
Imposing tile unit sum identifying restriction has been criticized on these grounds by 
Lucas (1972) and Sargent (197 I)  in the context  (if  estimating Phillips ( OR'Cs.
 It.  Such an explanation 0f the Gibson paradox is implemented  in Sargent tI 971a,
 1 973d 
That theory of stock prices states that the value of firms'  bonds and equities .5  is gisen
by 
- fj  + 8- IT)lK 5=  PK 
where MP5 is the expected marginal product of capital. (See Sargent l973a, p. 430, for
one derivation of this formula,) Tohin defines  ci as the ratio S/!'k': 
[ttP  (r  - 11 -- ril 9=  +1 f-rn 
o Inch. given \ll',  jç insersc'l  with the real rate of interest,  r - ir. 
An explanation could be constructcd by referring to equation 17 in Sargent l973c1), and
positing that the relative importance of the first term on the right side increases during
periods oh high inflation, such  as those experienced in the postwar. It would  require
niore empirical evidence than is now available to confirm such an explanation.
This is an example of the old point that use of optimal policy feedback rules  can make goal variables look approximately  constant, and so seem invariant with  respect to
movements in the policy variables even when the goal variables are not invariant with respect to the policy variables. 
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